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INTEREST RATE POLICIES AND BORROWING COSTS 
IN RURAL FINANCIAL MARKETS 
Abstract 
Hidden costs are an important feature of credit transactions 
in rural financial markets of lesser developed countries. There 
is frequently a trade-off between explicit interest charges and 
implicit borrowing costs such that smaller borrowers experience 
relatively greater borrowing costs than larger borrowers in a 
low, subsidized interest rate setting. Implicit interest and 
explicit interest are found to be perfect substitutes, and lending 
institutions exercise loan rate differentiation through implicit 
charges to borrowers. Changes in the explicit interest rate have 
a differential impact by loan size. i 
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1. 
INTEREST RATE POLICIES AND BORROWING COSTS 
IN RURAL FINANCIAL MARKETS 
Introd·1ction 
The purp0se of this paper is to investigate the nature and magni-
tude of borrowing costs imposed by lenders on agricultural borrowers in 
an envirorunent of controlled and fragmented interest rates for loans, 
targeting or end-use requirements imposed by governmental authorities 
or international donors, and specialized lending institutions dealing 
with agricultural credit. In this environment lending institutions 
exercise price-setting or loan rate differentiation through the non-
interest component of the price vector associated with loan operations. 
In so doing they consider the range of pre-determined explicit 
interest rates they can charge, over which they have a limited discre-
tionary power, and the relevant features of the loan operation that 
can play the role of proxies for risk. 
Using data from a farm level survey of clients of selected 
lenders in Honduras, it is found that non-interest borrowing transaction 
costs add approximately 3 percentage points to the average explicit 
interest rate. Transaction costs per loan are an increasing function 
of loan size, but with an elasticity of response below unity, thereby 
making transaction costs per currency unit (lempira) a decreasing 
function of loan size. Implicit interest (transaction costs) and 
explicit interest are found to be perfect substitutes. A one percent 
increase in the explicit interest rate leads to a one percent decrease 
in transaction costs per lempira and vice versa. This unit elasticity 
between implicit and explicit interest has a differential impact by 
loan size. A given change in the explicit interest rate creates a 
larger absolute change in the opposite direction in average transaction 
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costs per lempira for smaller loans than for larger loans. Therefore 
the impact of a rise in the explicit interest rate will be relatively 
greater in increasing total borrowing costs for larger sized loans 
than for smaller sized loans. 
Section 2 of the paper addresses the relevant theoretical issues 
involved in the analysis of implicit-pricing of loan funds and the 
implications for empirical work. A general formulation of a model is 
set forth and discussed in Section 3, along with some preliminary 
insights into the empirical results. In Section 4 a specific version 
of that model is presented and the main results of its estimation 
using multiple regression techniques are then discussed. Some 
concluding remarks and policy implications are outlined in the final 
section. 
2. Loan Rate Differentiation and Implicit Pricing 
Borrowers are seen by lenders as essentially non-homogenous. 
Each borrower has a different demand function for loanable funds and, 
more importantly, different borrowers have different risk characteristics 
and therefore different probabilities of repaying their loans. Since 
lenders are concerned with the expected return on loans which is a 
decreasing function of risk, they will be interested in using various 
"screening devices" with their borrowers [7], of which the interest rate 
would be the most important. 
Thus loan rate differentiation is a necessary element of lenders' 
behavior if they are to maximize profits. Some literature on credit rationing 
has approached this issue by considering lenders as price-setting entities 
that optimize along the borrower's demand function [3], 
even though this price-discriminating behavior is not necessarily 
'. 
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determined only by different demand elasticities. Different risk charac-
teristics of customers, and, in this sense, different costs associated with 
the loan op~ration also play a role [2]. The price 
setting analyti~al model set forth below closely follows those presented by 
Jaffee and Modigliani [3] and Jaffee and Russell [4], with some additional 
extensions relevant for the purposes of this paper. 
It is assumed that lenders maximize the expected value of their 
profits, 1T, which in a loan operation are given by: 
1T = LR[P] - LC (1) 
where, 
LR is the size of the loan contract given by: 
R, the interest rate factor R = 1 + r, and 
L = L (R,W), the borrower's loan demand function faced by 
' 
the lender. This function derives from a multi-period 
optimization in which the borrower behaves as price-taker, 
and where W represents the individual's resource endowment 
that influences the potential size of his/her investment 
projects. It is assumed that L' = 6L/6R < 0 
P = P (L,R) is the likelihood of repayment (the >. function in 
Jaffee and Russell, [4])~hich is conditional on the value of a 
minimum cost of default Z that determines the range of contract 
sizes over which default is observed. 
P (L,R) 1 if LR < Z 
P (L,R) < 1, PL < 0, P~ < 0, for LR > z!/ 
where the prime denotes the partial derivative with respect to 
the variable that appears as a subscript. C is the cost of funds 
for the lender which is assumed constant (i.e. the marginal cost 
is equal to average cost). 
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Maximization of (1) with respect to the loan rate factor R gives the 
first order condition: 
I 
PL + PRL' + LRPR - CL 0 (2) 
which can be rearranged as 
RP (L' + ~ + L P'R ) = CL' R p 
and then stated in terms of the elasticities of the loan demand function 
{n) and of the likelihood function (E) with respect to the loan rate 
factor:~/ 
RP [l + !_ (1 + E)] = C 
n 
In other words, the expected marginal revenue is set equal to the 
marginal cost, therefore the optimal loan rate is determined by: 
R* = C/P[l + !_ (1 + E)] 
n 
(3) 
(4) 
That is, the loan rate would be optimally set considering the probability 
of repayment (P), the borrower's demand elasticity (n) and the response 
of P to changes in R (E). In general form, R (and thus r) will be a 
function of loan demand and the probability of repayment, together with 
the perceived response of those functions to variations in R. 
Note that under certainty of payment (P=l, £=0) condition (3) 
reduces to the familiar result in monopolistic equilibrium: 
R (1 + !. ) = C 
n 
(S) 
The two basic reasons for loan rate differentiation are swnmarized 
in equation (4): first, as the likelihood of repayment, P, diminishes, 
i.e. ceteris paribus the loan becomes riskier, the interest rate factor 
R (and therefore r) will go up. Second, customers with different demand 
elasticities will be charged (everthing else constant) different rates. 
An additional element in (4) is the response of the probability of 
repayment to changes in R. However, its behavior will not be discussed 
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here, considering the simplifying assumptions made with respect to the 
P function)/ 
It it.: important to point out that pure monopoly pr!.ce S'~tting is 
not a necessary condition for this loan rate diiferentiation process. 
As asserted in Stiglitz and Weiss [7], many banks can compete by means 
of their choice of a price (interest rate) that maximizes their profits. 
However, the typical environment in which lenders perform their activities 
in lesser developed countries (LDCs) is characterized by institutional 
arrangements that constrain price-setting or loan rate differentiation. 
These restrictions are particularly strong in rural financial markets 
in LDCs where the targeting of credit flows to specified groups or 
end-use requirements for loan funds at concessionary (and controlled) 
interest rates prevail [l]. 
In this setting lenders, facing constraints on loan rate differen-
tiation, will engage in "regulatory avoidance" or implicit-price 
setting [5]. This involves establishing different procedures for 
credit allocation, monitoring and supervision that create both lender 
and borrower transactions costs (see [1,6]). This amounts to exercising 
price-setting through the non-interest component of the price vector. 
Lenders are substituting the discriminatory application of loan 
procedures among borrowers for explicit loan rate differentiation. 
Also, to the extent that different sources of funds (international 
donors, government, etc.) allow lenders to charge slightly different 
loan rates, lenders will use their limited discretionary power on those 
rates to set their prices. This price setting procedure places 
borrowers into different "tracks", where the number and height of the 
obstacles to negotiate loans in each track (i.e. transaction costs) 
are controlled by the lending institutions, enabling them to ration 
out unwanted (risky) clients and ration in desired clients. 
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Furthermore, the lender can transfer the burden of transaction 
costs from himself to the borrower in the form of administrative charges, 
fees, documentation requirements and charges, compensatory balances, 
etc. Borrowers will experience a rise in their total borrowing costs 
equivalent to the implicit charges passed on by the lender. There is 
however, as Kane [5] points out, some degree of waste embodied in implicit 
pricing since this effort diverts economic resources from other uses. 
In the present context, this consideration implies that total borrower's 
costs will eventually differ from the actual revenue or total price 
perceived by the lender by the amount of that "waste". This wedge is 
neglected in the following analysis assuming that the behavior of borrower's 
costs indeed is reflecting accurately the differential loan rates 
(inclusive of implicit charges) that lenders impose. 
In terms of the simple model developed above, the interest rate 
factor R should now be interpreted in the broad sense of including 
explicit and implicit interest, i.e. the rate r would consist of an 
explicit rate (i) and an implicit element (c) which result from 
expressing borrowing transaction costs per loan on a percent basis. 
It is precisely this component of the total price that will be affected 
by the variables involved in equation (4), i.e. borrower's riskiness 
and demand conditions, since the explicit rate is bounded by the 
existing regulations. 
A result of the foregoing discussion is that the loan demand 
curve and the average borrowing cost schedule are essentially the 
same locus in the (L,R) space, except for expectational errors due 
to imperfect information. Models that consider loan demand and average J 
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borrowing costs as essentially different schedules (e.g. Ladman, [6] ) 
are unsolvable. 
In sununary, it is a~gued here that lenders in rural f~nancial 
markets in LDCs are price-setters (of explicit and implicit interest 
charges) that take as given the profile of loan demand such as farm size, 
loan amount, enterprise type, and other characteristics of the borrower. 
Lenders then set explicit interest charges and, more importantly, 
establish differential administrative procedures that are in effect 
transformed into implicit charges (i.e. transaction costs for the 
borrower) according to these loan demand characteristics. 
In what follows field survey results are investigated that show 
how agricultural lenders in Honduras have in practice adjusted their 
credit procedures to allocate credit in the context of various end-use 
requirements and a limited range of explicit interest rates within 
which they were able to operate. We will discover to what extent they 
in fact transferred transaction costs to borrowers according to selected 
features of the loan operation as proxies for risk. 
3. A General Model and Some Empirical Results 
A general formulation of the model used to test the relationships 
hypothesized in the preceding section is as follows: 
where: 
T = T (B,i) (6) 
T is the borrowing (non-interest) transaction costs per loan 
B is a vector of risk-related characteristics of the loan operation 
(loan size, farm size, end-use, etc.) 
i is the explicit interest rate that can be charged on loans. 
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Transaction costs are defined here as all those non-interest 
explicit and implicit expenses incurred by the borrower in the process 
of obtaining a loan. These costs occur at different stages of the 
sequence of procedures established by the lending institution, in geneval: 
application and documentation, approval, and disbursement. Explicit 
expenses refer basically to the following: 
(a) Cost of transportation, lodging and meals when travelling 
to the office of the institution granting the loan, or to 
other places with the purpose of obtaining related documents. 
(b) Fees, taxes or other charges associated with the issuing 
of docwnents, registration of guarantees or collateral, 
contracts and the like. 
(c) Other explicit charges imposed by the lending institutions 
in the process of handling the application. 
The implicit transaction costs directly related to borrowing 
correspond to the value of the time foregone by farmers attributable 
to negotiating and securing their loan. 
Components of B in the model ref er to those proxies associated 
with risk. The key elements here from the point of view of the lender 
are farm size (associated with farm wealth and the capacity for loan 
recovery); the loan amount (the larger the amount the greater the risk); 
and loan use (enterprise type characteristics associated with 
different levels of farming risks, marketing risks, built-in collateral, 
etc.) 
Data utilized in the field study came from a random sample of 
farm level clients of selected lenders in Honduras. The survey was 
J 
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undertaken in August 1981 and consisted of a total of 198 farmer-clients 
of which 104 had loans from the National Agricultural Development Bank 
(BANADESA), 52 from private commercial banks and 42 from small rural 
credit unions. Approximately one-half of the total sample of farm 
borrowers had loans less than 5,000 lempiras (i.e. $2,500 at the current 
exchange rate of two lempiras equal to one dollar). The average loan 
size however was close to 23,000 lempiras indicating a clear asynnnetry 
or skewness in the overall distribution of.loans. 
Although the distribution of the clientele for each loan source 
overlaps to some extent, each can be clearly identified with respect 
to the predominant scope of their operations in terms of loan and farm 
size. Rural credit unions in Honduras are the classic small fanner 
loan source with most loans below 2,000 lempiras on farms typically 
less than 20 hectares. At the other extreme are the farmer-clients 
of the private commercial banks with the larger proportion of their 
loans over 25,000 lempiras on farms generally above 100 hectares. The 
national agricultural development bank (BANADESA) activity falls in 
between with a majority of its loan operations between 1,000 and 10,000 
lempiras on farms largely between 10 and 100 hectares. 
The aggregate results for the sample as a whole indicate that the 
various elements of borrower transactions costs added roughly three 
percentage points to the average explicit interest rate of 13 percent. 
This represents almost one quarter of the interest rate. More 
importantly however is the incidence of these borrowing costs by loan 
and farm size in the sample. Table 1, panels A and B, highlight the 
results of transactions or borrowing costs per loan and per lempira. 
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Transactions costs per loan are positively related to both loan and 
farm size, however, when one takes into account the size of the loan 
it can be seen that transactions costs per lempira are negatively 
related to both loan and farm size. In short the smaller the farm 
and the smaller the loan, the greater the' relative importance of 
transactions costs per lempira. 
4. Multiple Regression Model and Results 
A more formal estimation of the determinants of total transaction 
costs was undertaken using a power function specification for the 
variables in question. The form of this specification is as follows: 
and 
where 
and 
T 
'[ 
T 
T 
A 
L 
i 
~/L (i.e. transactions cost per lempira). 
transactions cost per loan in lempiras. 
farm size in hectares 
approved loan amount in lempiras 
the explicit interest rate 
e = the base of the natural logarithms 
H a1n1 + a 2n2 + b1u1 + b2u2 + b3u3 
(7) 
(8) 
with n1 and n2 dummy variables representing the deviation of T in private 
banks and credit unions with respect to BANADESA, the base or level of 
reference; and ul, u2 and u3 being dunnny variables defined to handle the 
deviations due to enterprise type or end-use of the loan in basic 
grains u1 , export crops u2 , and livestock u3 , with respect to the 
miscellaneous end-use category of all other end-uses in agriculture 
J 
' 
c 
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(land purchases, trade, vegetable c~ops, etc.). This specification 
was chosen in order to directly estimate the elasticities of trans-
actions costs with respect to the proxies for loan risk and the 
explicit interest rate. At the same time the per lanpira specification 
allows us to correct for any potential problan of h~teroskedasticity.~/ 
The results of the ordinary least squares estimation for the log 
linear transformation of equation (7) are presented in columns 1, 2 and 
3 in Table 2. Those corresponding to equation (8) are presented in 
columns 4, 5, and 6 of the same table. The two sets of estimated 
equations are consistent with each other, i.e. the exponents of loan 
amounts for equations 4, 5 and 6 are the same as for equations 1, 2 
and 3, minus one. The signs, the magnitude and significance level 
of all the other coefficients are consistent with the previous discussion. 
Among the more relevant findings is the fact that farm size is 
not significant. Dropping this variable frcm the equation does not 
change the overall significance and, in the end, simplifies the 
specification. This may be reflecting the fact that farm size does 
not constitute a good proxy for farmer's wealth in the Honduran 
setting, given the heterogeneity of land between and within different 
areas of the country. Another interesting finding is that transaction 
costs per loan are an increasing function of loan size. This can be 
seen in Figure 1 where this result is portrayed for reference. This 
finding contradicts the assumption made in scme studies (e.g. Ladman, 
[6] ) that transaction costs are independent of loan size. The behavior 
of these costs with respect to loan size highlights the cost economies 
I 
I 
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evident in making larger sized loans. The elasticity of transaction 
or borrowing costs with respect to loan size is less than one (it ranges 
from 0.26 to 0.37 in Table 2) while the level of the explicit interest 
rate is a shift parameter in this relationship as can be seen in 
Figure 1. 
As a consequence of the foregoing relationship, transaction costs 
per lempira is a monotonically decreasing function of loan size with 
the explicit interest rate as a shift parameter, as seen in Figure 2. 
In other words, for a given loan size, an increase in the interest 
rate that lenders charge would lead to a reduction of transactions 
costs per lempira. 
The most interesting finding emerging from these data is that the 
elasticity of T, transaction costs per lempira, with respect to the 
explicit nominal interest rate is not statistically different from 
minus one; the range of values obtained is -0.8662 through -1.0761 
and the t-tests performed on these estimates indicate we cannot reject 
the hypothesis that the elasticity is minus one. This means that t 
and i are perfect substitut·es for each other, in the sense that a one 
percent increase in the explicit interest rate leads to a one percent 
decline in transaction costs per lempira. 
An additional finding here is that this elasticity of t to changes 
in i has a differential impact on the borrowing costs of different loan 
sizes. Figure 3 illustrates this point where loan size is the shift 
parameter in this diagram. The curve shifts downward (towards the origin) 
when loan size increases and upward (away from the origin) when the loan 
size decreases. At a given explicit interest rate i , a change in i 
0 
-~ 
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will create a larger absolute change in the opposite direction in average 
transaction costs per lempira for smaller loans than for larger loans 
(see Figure 3). 
This result implies that a rise in the explicit interest rate will 
create a relatively more progressive or equitable result in that this 
increase will reduce the absolute borrowing or transaction costs per 
lempira for smaller sized loans relatively more than for larger sized 
loans. 
An evaluation of the change in total borrowing costs (i + T) 
brought about by a change in the explicit interest rate (i) that 
considers this offsetting effect on transaction costs (T) can be 
seen below, for different loan sizes: 
Loan Size (in lernpiras) 
1,000 
5,300 (median value 
in the sample) 
100,000 
d (T+i) /di 
o.~o 
.93 
.99 
Thus a one point increase in the interest rate will only create 0.8 of 
a point increase in total borrowing costs for a loan size of 1,000 
lempiras and 0.99 of a point increase for 100,000 lempiras. The 
offsetting decline in non-interest borrowing or transactions costs 
is stronger for smaller sized loans. 
With respect to differences between institutions, the results 
suggest that, ceteris paribus, it is more expensive for borrowers to 
deal with private banks and less expensive with rural credit unions 
I 
I 
I 
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than it is to borrow from BANADESA. In other words, the estimated 
functions shift upwards in the case of private banks and shift downwards 
whe~ lenders are rural credit unions. The non-significance of the 
estimated coefficients for the dutm11y variables representing different 
end+use of loans suggest that lending institutions (probably well aware 
of the credit diversion phenomenon) do not consider this feature when 
setting up their different procedures. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
The issue of non-interest borrowing costs is an important feature 
of rural financial markets. This study illustrates how these non-
interest borrowing costs in Honduras are significantly associated with 
loan size and represent (on a per lempira basis) a substitute for 
interest charges. It was found there was a differential incidence of 
borrowing costs by loan size such that a rise in the interest rate would 
have a greater relative effect in increasing total borrowing costs 
for larger than smaller loans and, conversely, a decline in interest 
rates would lower total borrowing costs relatively more for larger than 
smaller loan sizes. Subsidized credit programs therefore may have an 
inequitable effect on borrowers by loan size. 
The price-setting framework utilized in this paper seems appropriate 
for the analysis of lender-borrower relationships in the LDC context. 
Further developments should emphasize the consideration of collateral 
requirements in the model and the improvement of linkages between the 
analytical model and its empirical counterpart. 
J 
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FOOTNOTES 
1/ 
- Note that P~ = oP/oR < 0 does not ensure dP/dR < 0 since the latter 
is given by dP/dR = P~L' +P~ where the first term to the right of the 
equal sign is positive (since L' < O) thus making the sign of dP/dR 
indetermined. 
'!:./see the Appendix for the derivation of this expression. 
l/rn particular the role of collateral, not considered here, may be 
important in determining the behavior of the likelihood of repayment 
and expected revenue. 
!! . /It was observed in fact, that, the variance of T increased for 
partitions of the sample of increasing loan sizes. 
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APPENDIX 
Equilibriwn Condition for Expected-Profit Maximization 
TI = LR[P] - LC 
L(R,W) where L 
p P(L,R) 
maximizing with respect to R 
on 
oR = PL+ PRL' + LRP~ - CL' 
.h , oL , oP 
w ere L = oR' PR = oR 
rearranging 
RP(L' 
and factoring 
P' 
+ ~ + L __g_) R p 
dividing through by L' 
P' 
RP (1 + L ~ + ~ __g_) L' R L' P 
then defining 
out RP 
CL' 
c 
0 
CL R R n = OR L = L' L' elasticity of demand for loan funds 
£ oP R P' R = OR P = R P' elasticity of the probability of repayment 
with respect to R 
(la) 
(2a) 
(3a) 
(4a) 
1 The second element in parenthesis in (4a) can be recognized as , and the 
n 
£ third tenn in that parenthesis can be transformed into - by multiplying 
and dividing by (R). Then (4a) becomes 
RP(l + ! + f.) = C 
n n 
n 
which gives equation (3) 1 in the text once - is factored out within 
the parenthesis. 
RP[l + !(l + e:)] 
n 
n 
c 
(5a) 
(6a) 
I 
I 
I 
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Table 1. Borrowing Costs per Loan and per Lempira by 
Farm Size and Loan Size. 
Panel A. Borrowing Costs i by Farm Size* 
Transaction 
Costs Interest Total Borrowing Costs 
Farm Size Per Loan Rate Per LemEi.ra (%) 
Category (Has.) (L,es.) (%) A,e,eroved Disbursed 
Less than 5 31.75 13 16.0 17. 33 
5.1 - 10 40.0 13 15.07 17.14 
10.1 - 20 53.5 13 16.20 17.67 
20.1 - 50 56.25 13 14.64 15.52 
50.1 - 100 75.0 13 14.84 15.64 
100.1 - 200 133. 7 5 13. 5 16.52 17.52 
More than 200 149.25 13 13. 82 14.02 
Panel B. Borrowing Costs! by Loan Size* 
Transaction 
Costs Interest Total Borrowing Costs 
Loan Size Per Loan Rate Per LemEira (%) 
Category (LEs.) (LES.) (%) AEEroved Disbursed 
Less than 1,000 30.75 13 18.92 19.23 
1,001 - 2,000 42.0 13 16.07 17.73 
2,001 - 5,000 44.88 13 14.88 15. 77 
5,001 - 10,000 53.0 13 14.03 14.94 
10,001 - 15,000 86.75 13 14.56 14.87 
15,001 - 25,000 42.75 13. 5 13 .89 14.35 
25,001 - 50,000 131.50 14 14.40 15. 71 
50,001 - 100,000 322.50 13 13.17 13 .63 
More than 100,000 1,414.50 11 12.09 12.36 
. . 
• 
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Table 1 (continued) 
*All values are median values. Therefore, the median values of 
total borrowing costs are not necessarily the stun of the median 
values of the separate transaction costs per lempira plus the 
median value of the interest rate, as they would be if mean values 
had been used. 
Source: Survey results. 
Table 2. Regression Analysis of Transaction Costs Per Loan and Transaction Costs 
Per Lempira. Estimated Coefficients in Different Regressions* 
Explanatory Transaction Costs Per Loan Eguations Transaction Costs Per LemEira Eguations 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Area of the Farm 0.0758 0.0001 0.0758 0.0001 
( 1.01) ( 0.0) ( 1.01) ( 0.0) 
Loan Amount 0.2621 0.3387 0.3658 -0.7378 -0.6612 . -o. 6342 
( 3.14) 8 ( 3.84)a ( 5.3o)a (-8.84)a (-7.50)a (-9.19)a 
Interest Rate + -1.0781 -0.9237 -0.8662 -1.0781 -0.9237 -0.8662 
(-4.47)a (-3.78)a (-3.63)a (-4 .4 na (-3.78)a (-3.63)a 
Loan Source: 
Private Banks 0.54 0.59 0.50 0.54 0.59 0.50 I 
( 2. 20)b < 2.2o)b ( 1. 93) b < 2.2o)b < 2.2o)b ( l.93)b N c I 
Credit Unions -1.02 -0.83 -0.83 -1.02 -0.83 -0.83 
(-4.47)a (-3 .ll)a (-3. 23)a (-4 .4 7)a (-3.ll)a (-3. 23)a 
Loan Use: 
Basic Grains 0.36 0.34 0.36 0.34 
( 1.36) ( 1. 36) ( 1. 36) ( 1.36) 
Export Crops -0.34 -0.38 -0.34 -0.38 
(-1. 09) (-1. 28) (-1.09) (-1. 28) 
Livestock 0.49 0.45 0.49 0.45 
( 1. 50) ( 1.48) ( 1. 50) ( 1.48) 
Intercept 4.47 3.42 3.09 9.07 8.03 7.69 
( 5.0l)a ( 3 .4o)a ( 3.32)a (10.17)a ( 7.97)a ( 8.27)a 
R-Square 0.43 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.49 0.48 
F Value 26.66a 18.8la 22. 2oa 29.69a 20.8oa . 23.46a 
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Table 2 (continued) 
*t-statistics in parentheses. Significance levels: a, 0.01; b, 0.05. 
+t-statistics for the hypothesis o=-1 were computed with the following results: eq. 4: -0.3237; 
eq. 5: 0.3124; eq. 6: 0.5609. Therefore the hypothesis is not rejected in any of these cases. 
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